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The Brazilian Air Force faces a huge challenge in the assignment process. While 
aviators outnumber any other community, there are few jobs related to aviation 
available for senior officers. As a consequence, when junior aviators who 
invested their time improving their skills in air operations are promoted to senior 
ranks, they must be assigned to managerial positions in areas they don’t master. 
The problem becomes worse in the absence of career paths for senior officers 
and at the discretion of officers and commands to present their preferences in the 
assignment process with no regard for previous job experience. 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model for assigning senior 
officers without specialization, as it occurs among aviators in the Brazilian Air 
Force, so that job performance can be maximized. The model uses linear 
programming and takes individual preferences and organizational needs into 
consideration. The results of simulation in three different scenarios suggest that it 
is possible to capitalize on previous job experience and simultaneously satisfy 
the interests of officers and commands. One expected benefit of the study is the 
natural specialization of senior officers, without the intervention of career 
managers. 
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The Brazilian Air Force was created in 1941 during the Second World War 
by gathering all personnel, equipment, and facilities from the Navy and Army 
aviation branches. Just after clustering all airpower resources, the new Brazilian 
service was employed in combat to support the Allied war effort. Patrolling the 
South Atlantic and providing air liaison to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, as 
well as conducting air reconnaissance and interdiction missions in Italy, the 
importance of pilots became evident among the first Air Force officers. 
According to Robbins and Judge (2012, 223), “an organization’s current 
customs, traditions, and general way of doing things are largely due to what it 
has done before and how successful it was in doing it.” The founders exert a 
strong influence on an organization’s culture, because they are not committed to 
any previous culture, and the small size of a newborn organization makes it easy 
to impose their vision. The founders start the cycle. First, they select and keep 
those who share the same beliefs. Second, they reinforce their way of thinking by 
indoctrination and socialization. Finally, they hand over to the next generation, 
who will sustain the founders’ beliefs as the only reasonable way of thinking. 
The organizational culture of the Brazilian Air Force is not only driven by 
historical facts but also by specific features that distinguish any air force from 
other services. 
In the Air Force, the division is between pilots and all others. 
Whereas there has always been a healthy rivalry among pilots of 
different types of aircraft (not only among the categories of aircraft 
flown, but even down to models of the same category), pilots are 
collectively on a plateau quite far removed from all others, including 
flight crew members and ballistic missile officers. Pilots are likely to 
identify themselves as pilots even more than as Air Force officers. 
(Builder 1989, 26) 
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The strong culture in favor of pilots puts them in charge of the Brazilian Air 
Force, not only as a consequence of their perceived importance, but also 
because their community is the largest one among officers.  
The officer community is divided into career officers and temporary 
officers. Each category starts and ends at different ranks (Table 1). 
Table 1.   Specialties and ranks in the Brazilian Air Force (after 




JUNIOR SENIOR GENERAL 
 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 
CAREER OFFICER 
         Aviator                   
Engineer                   
Intendant                   
Physician                   
Dentist                   
Pharmacist                   
Infantryman                   
Aircraft Specialist                   
Communication Specialist                   
Armament Specialist                   
Photography Specialist                   
Meteorology Specialist                   
Air Traffic Control Specialist                   
Technical Supply Specialist                   
Aeronautics Specialist                   
          TEMPORARY OFFICER          
Complementary Officer                   
 
The pilots, or aviators as they are called in Brazil, belong to the only 
community that can reach the highest rank in the Brazilian Air Force, even 
though they start at the lowest grade. Since they perform the main activity in the 
Air Force, the junior officers are allowed to dedicate their time almost exclusively 
to planning air operations and flying their aircrafts. The burden of clerical 
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activities is delegated to aeronautics specialists and complementary officers, who 
run the administration at the junior level. At this point, the inventory of officers at 
junior rank is reasonable (Figure 1). Twenty percent of junior officers can be 
dedicated to air operation, because 39.5% (21.8% + 17.7%) will be on station to 
handle administrative issues. 
 
Figure 1.  Distribution of junior officers by specialty (after Presidente da 
República Federativa do Brasil 2014) 
The reality at senior rank is very different. Aeronautics specialists and 
complementary officers do not reach this grade and consequently cannot replace 
aviators in managerial activities. On the other hand, aviators who capitalized 
experience in air operations find themselves as chiefs in many different areas. 
The point is that the absence of aeronautics specialists and complementary 
officers and the difference in promotion rate among the specialties change the 
balance in the inventory of senior officers, increasing the aviator rate to 40.2% 
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 Figure 2.  Distribution of senior officers by specialty (after Presidente da 
República Federativa do Brasil 2014) 
This inventory would be understandable if the organizational structure of 
the Brazilian Air Force had enough operational billets to absorb 40% of the senior 
officers. Instead, the organizational structure is administrative and not 
operational, with many areas of specialization demanding managers. 
At the highest level of management, the Brazilian Air Force (Figure 3) is 
organized in one general staff, seven sector departments, and 10 assistance 
offices. These organizations are collectively known as Organizations of General 
and Sectorial Management and Direct Assistance to the Air Force Commander 
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 Figure 3.  Simplified layout of the Brazilian Air Force organizational 
structure (after Centro de Comunicação Social da Aeronáutica 
[CECOMSAER] 2014) 
Most of the areas work systemically. This means that an aviator can be 
assigned to any of these domains regardless of the department or hierarchical 
level in the organization. For example, an aviator in the Air Operations Command 
(COMGAR) can be assigned to work in personnel, intelligence, logistics, public 
affairs, flight safety, or other areas, even though the department is specialized in 
air operations. The difference is that, if he is a junior, someone will take care of 
the office for him. But if he is a senior, he will be expected to make decisions 
about issues that require a level of experience he may not have. 
Moreover, these areas of specialization overlap across jobs. Someone 
working with personnel may need to have knowledge about education. Logistics 
is associated with finance. Air operation and flight safety are interconnected. 
Depending on the job, the aviator may be required to have experience in many 
areas, in different proportions. 
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The need to specialize the aviators was debated by the Air Staff (EMAER) 
in 2010 during a workgroup that studied the educational system in eight air forces 
from North America and Europe. One of the proposals suggested a reduction in 
the number of aviators in relation to the total inventory of officers, transferring 
tasks to other specialties. This would decrease the variety of jobs for aviators, 
increasing specialization and improving performance. Another proposal 
suggested the implementation of the career manager, as used in many studied 
countries. The career manager would help officers choose jobs that satisfy 
individual preferences and organizational needs. Each job would be available in 
specific career paths, which would reinforce the officers’ specializations and 
improve their performances. 
Four years later, neither proposal was implemented. The culture that 
dictates that aviators must be in charge of the entire service by working in 
different areas is still in force. Whether it is appropriate or not, the point is that the 
lack of specialization in the largest community in the Brazilian Air Force imposes 
a huge challenge on the assignment process. 
Since aviators outnumber any other specialty, they are appointed to a 
great variety of jobs in order to run the operational and administrative tasks. The 
commands have discretion to lay down the organizational needs and select the 
officers holistically, regardless of their experience. The officers do not have the 
support of career managers to narrow down their preferences in career paths. 
They are free to make any choice, regardless of their own skills, exacerbating the 
loss of human capital even more. 
Once a year, the officers of the Brazilian Air Force who have fulfilled 
specific requirements are rotated to other stations. Since it generates a fixed cost 
that cannot be avoided, it is important that the Air Force gets the maximum 
benefit from this process. But under this background, the Brazilian Air Force 
cannot assign the right person to the right place. 
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B. PURPOSE 
This purpose of this thesis is to create an algorithm to be used in the 
assignment process of senior officers without specialization, as it occurs among 
aviators in the Brazilian Air Force, so that job performance can be maximized. 
The assignment process deals with two apparently conflicting forces: the 
individual preference for specific jobs and the institutional preference for specific 
officers. If officers are assigned to jobs they don’t like, regardless of the reason, 
motivation decreases, which leads to less effort spent on the job and poorer 
performance. If they are assigned to jobs they don’t fit, due to lack of experience 
or education, their performance decreases as well. 
Since the current assignment process does not capitalize on previous job 
experience, the proposed algorithm for assigning officers will also incorporate 
this variable in order to maximize performance. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Question 
• How should individual preferences and organizational needs 
be balanced during the assignment process in order to 
maximize senior officers’ performance in the Brazilian Air 
Force? 
Secondary Questions 
• Which performance drivers are relevant for the assignment 
process? 
• Which decision modeling techniques are applicable in the 
assignment process? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of searching for 
relevant variables that affect individual performance, according to theories of 
work performance, and applying them in an optimization model for the 
assignment process. 
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The first literature review summarizes the officer assignment process in 
the Brazilian Air Force and U.S. Navy. The differences are described in order to 
provide suggestions for a future implementation of the model. 
A second review presents the variables that affect performance, according 
to theories of work performance. However, the characteristics of the assignment 
process make only a few of them relevant to be incorporated in the algorithm. 
The third review introduces the concept of decision modeling and presents 
the results of previous studies regarding the application of linear programming in 
assignment problems. The weakness of each one is analyzed to guide the 
development of the model. 
The last step is to propose an algorithm for the Brazilian Air Force that fits 
its specific needs based on the conclusions drawn from the previous literature 
reviews. The algorithm is evaluated by analyzing the results obtained through 
simulation in different scenarios. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
One of the most well-documented findings from studies of individual 
and organizational behavior is that organizations and their 
members resist change. 
–Robbins and Judge 2012, 235  
 
To avoid conflict with the organizational culture, this research looks for a 
solution that causes the minimum change in the modus operandi of the Brazilian 
Air Force. 
The research could have been a cost-benefit analysis of increasing the 
number of officers in more specialized communities, so that the aviators could be 
released to operational jobs. Even if it generated net benefits, this proposal could 
face cultural barriers for approval, since it decreases the proportion of aviators, 
changing the balance of power inside the Brazilian Air Force. 
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Another alternative could have been splitting the aviation community into 
subspecialties since graduation from the Air Force Academy. In this case, the 
resistance to change could be driven by the burden of planning many career 
paths and the unknown constraints imposed on the distribution process. 
This research has a different scope. It proposes a mathematical model for 
the assignment process to solve the problem with minor changes in the modus 
operandi. The evaluation of the model does not include comparisons with real 
data. The Brazilian Air Force does not track changes in assignments or 
experience electronically, which makes this approach unfeasible. Instead, results 
from the simulation of assigning random cohorts are analyzed statistically. The 
simulation intends to demonstrate that it is possible to capitalize experience 
through the assignment process and create specialization among officers, 
respecting individual preferences. 
F. EXPECTED BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
The study is expected to show that both officers and commands can 
experience mutual benefits using an algorithm that maximizes shared interests 
instead of divergent preferences. 
The algorithm is designed to optimize the use of human capital while 
matching officers and jobs. The greater the experience accumulated in one type 
of activity, then the greater is the chance to use it again. If the algorithm works as 
designed, the officers will have a natural specialization without the intervention of 
a career manager. This benefit will be visible at higher ranks, because the 
officers will hold key positions in areas where they have the most experience. In 
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II. OFFICER DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
A. BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE PROCESS 
The Brazilian Air Force executes personnel management under the 
responsibility of the Air Force Personnel Command (COMGEP) in an annual 
period cycle composed of two processes. 
The first is the Planning process, in which manpower needs proposed by 
each organization are analyzed, adjusted, and approved. The second is the 
Distribution process, which is based on two indicators: the personnel inventory 
table (TLP) and the personnel strategic table (TEP). The TLP is the current 
inventory of military personnel grouped by rank and specialties, while the TEP is 
the manpower target level for each organization. Since there is a shortage of 
military personnel to fill all vacant jobs, the COMGEP uses the distribution 
process as a tool to achieve the same readiness among all organizations by 
keeping the TLP/TEP ratio constant. 
“The distribution of personnel includes activities that aim to ensure the 
existence of military personnel in all jobs, in amounts that meet the needs of 
human resources” (Comando da Aeronáutica 2014, 18). This statement, taken 
from the main source of manpower policy in the Brazilian Air Force, exemplifies 
the quantitative approach used in the officer distribution process. 
Aviation is the officer community most commonly affected by this policy. 
The official document that describes the expected qualification for each specialty 
lists 12 skills for aviators, all of them related to aviation issues (Comando-Geral 
do Pessoal 2012b, 12). However, since the inventory of aviators outnumbers any 
other community at senior ranks, the distribution process places them in many 
different jobs, unrelated to aviation, in order to meet manpower requirements. 
The policy that regulates the distribution process introduces the subject by 
stating how organizational interest and personal preference should be treated. 
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Every rotation is performed to meet the interest of the Service. 
When the military is included in Proposal of Organization, 
Operational Command or ODGSA, the personal preferences are 
consultative information to the search of a possible conciliation 
between the conveniences of the Service and the military. 
(Comando-Geral do Pessoal 2012a, 13) 
This process focuses on a military personnel rotation that has a 
permanent change of station and uses two types of plans: the Movement Plan 
(PLAMOV) and the Special Movement Plan. The employment of any one 
depends on the minimum period of two years on station, the existence of a 
vacant job in the next destination, and the impact on the TLP/TEP ratio. The 
most important plans for aviators are the PLAMOV and one category of Special 
Movement called Movement by Selection of Senior Officer (MPEOS). 
(1) PLAMOV 
The PLAMOV is the regular rotation plan for junior officers. Since the 
primary instructions are followed, the ODGSA have discretion to use their own 
criteria in assigning officers. 
The officer who meets the requirements fills out a form stating three 
locations where he would like to live and forwards it through the chain of 
command. For aviators, this wide range of possible choices does not affect their 
career, because junior officers are supposed to follow an operational path. The 
options are just an opportunity to choose from a few possibilities according to the 
operational specialization. 
After graduating from the Air Force Academy, the aviators attend an 
advanced operational course, in which they learn how to use the aircraft for 
military purposes. The aviator spends the junior ranks climbing the operational 
ladder. This is the regular career path, although some will diverge to 
administrative jobs sooner. For officers under operational orders, the Operational 
Command does the placement and assignment, but does not have autonomy to 
execute the distribution. The command submits the aggregated plan to the sector 
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department, who finishes the assignment and forwards the final plan to the 
COMGEP for execution. 
(2) MPEOS 
The MPEOS is the regular rotation plan for senior officers. Every time they 
hand over a command position assigned by the highest level of the Air Force, or 
graduate from the Command and Staff College, or return from an appointment 
abroad, they are automatically included in this plan.  
MPEOS is a process by which officers are “chosen by jobs” instead of 
“choosing the jobs.” The acronym is not completely right, because the officers 
can express their preference, even though it is not the main criterion. However, 
different from the junior officers, the senior officers do not have any operational 
or administrative career path to follow. Therefore, the ODGSA have discretion to 
choose any officer, and the officer to state any preference. 
The preferences are collected electronically through the MPEOS module 
of the Personnel Management Information System (SIGPES) in sequential order: 
first, the options of senior officers, and then, the choices of ODGSA 
representatives. There are no advocates for senior officers during this process. 
The officer’s choices may either translate their professional or personal 
preferences. 
The officer engaged in MPEOS should choose and rank one to nine 
combinations of locations and ODGSA from a given matrix (Figure 4), which 
presents available jobs for his rank and specialty (Comando-Geral do Pessoal 
2013, 4). In the case of aviators, there is a broad range of alternatives (blue cells 
in Figure 4) to choose from. If he is willing to live in Brasília or Rio de Janeiro, he 
can choose almost any main area of specialization, regardless of his experience. 
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 Figure 4.  Example of a real matrix for an O-5 aviator1 
Besides ranking his combined preferences, the officer is expected to 
provide some additional information in the MPEOS module, using text format. He 
should express his preference for specific organizations under each ODGSA, 
since more than one organization may exist in each location. He should also 
present his preference for areas of specialization, because even though each 
ODGSA has a central area of activity, the areas of specialization are systemic 
and most of them are available in many organizations. Finally, he should declare 
his overall experience and qualification.  
This additional information is forwarded to each ODGSA representative in 
order to assist their selection. However, according to the regulations, they are not 
compelled to follow the officer’s profile. So, the selection may be biased by 
friendship or hearsay. Using any criteria, they list all officers by rank and 
specialty in decreasing order of preference. 
 After all stakeholders have ranked their preferences, a mathematical 
model will attribute weights to officers and ODGSA preferences, taking into 
consideration the TLP/TEP ratio. The outcome will be the proposed distribution of 
officers. A meeting among ODGSA representatives at the COMGEP will be held 
in order to allow changes in the proposal for final approval. 
1 This figure is a print screen from the author’s personal record retrieved on July 3, 2014, 
from the MPEOS module. 
 14 
                                            
B. U.S. NAVY PROCESS 
The U.S. Navy executes manpower and personnel management as two 
distinct processes that include four sub-processes: Manpower Requirements, 
Manpower Programming, Personnel Planning, and Personnel Distribution. 
The first two sub-processes are focused on “spaces” to be filled. The 
Manpower Requirements are the translation of national strategic objectives into 
unconstrained manpower needs. These requirements are expressed as minimum 
skill, pay grade, and quantity to accomplish 100% of missions in a defined 
scenario (Hatch 2013, 39). The Manpower Programming is “the matching of 
available resources to validated requirements” (Butler and Molina 2002, 9). In 
this process, the requirements are prioritized and narrowed down to a 
determined quantity of personnel in order to fit the budget constraints. 
The following two sub-processes represent the “faces” in the manpower 
management. The Personnel Planning administers the total inventory by 
predicting gain and losses and using the community managers to shape each 
community with changes in manpower policies like recruiting and career 
development. The Personnel Distribution aims to assign the right person in the 
right place at the right time with the right skills (Hatch 2013, 144).  
The main concepts about the officer distribution process are described in 
two articles of the Navy Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN): 1301-100 
and 1301-102. 
(1) MILPERSMAN 1301-100 
The Navy Personnel Command is responsible for officer distribution and 
career development functions, which are merged in one single process. 
The development and optimum employment of a qualified, 
motivated work force is a universal, many-faceted problem. … 
Inventories must be kept in line with requirements and, at the same 
time, the individual officer must be provided with a meaningful, 
professional development pattern. (Bureau of Naval Personnel 
2003a, 2) 
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The mission of the officer distribution divisions in the Navy Personnel 
Command is summarized in three topics: 
a. To assign the best qualified officers to meet needs of the Navy 
as defined by the approved officer billet file.  
b. To assign officers to billets which develop their professional 
expertise so that the officer corps as a whole embodies leadership, 
technical, and managerial skills necessary to achieve the Navy’s 
mission.  
c. To assign officers sensitively and fairly, ensuring their continued 
professional motivation and dedication to the Navy. (Bureau of 
Naval Personnel 2003a, 2) 
This threefold mission is translated in the “Triad of Detailing,” which 
incorporates needs of the Navy, career needs of the individual, and desires of the 
individual. All three areas are considered for assigning officers. 
At one extreme, the needs of the Navy are deemed as “the most important 
factor” and override other interests. At another extreme, the desires of the 
individual are considered “extremely important,” since they affect the morale of 
the officer. In the middle, there are the career needs, whose satisfaction is 
wished by both the Navy and the officer. 
Operational, technical, and managerial areas of development are 
key elements in every officer’s career progression. … Each officer 
community has a basic career path that develops its officers to 
assume positions of increasing responsibility. Within a career path, 
there is a great deal of room for flexibility among assignments to 
achieve the desired results. Depending on the community, each 
officer must obtain certain qualifications during their career. 
(Bureau of Naval Personnel 2003a, 4) 
The Navy Personnel Command has a policy of encouraging direct 
communication between representatives and individuals in order to ensure that 
the three components of the Triad of Detailing are balanced. Each officer should 
submit their preferences and personal information one year before the projection 
rotation date. The preference information will be composed of a list of five 
choices for each one of the three available categories (command, billet, and 
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location), which will be ranked according to officer’s interest. These data will be 
inserted in a database to be used by the assignment officer, also called “detailer,” 
as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Example of officer’s preferences with personal information 
(from Black 2014, 22) 
(2) MILPERSMAN 1301-102 
There are two important stakeholders in this process as identified by the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel (2003b, 1). “The officer distribution process basically 
consists of identifying and placing a requirement (placement) and assigning an 
officer to fill the requirement (assignment).” The first is the placement officer, who 
represents the commands’ interest and has the responsibility of ensuring the best 
match between billet requirements and officer qualifications. The second is the 
assignment officer, who represents the officers’ interests and is responsible for 
ensuring that career needs and individual interests are taken into consideration. 
The process is cyclic. Whenever an officer is assigned to a different billet, 
the current billet becomes available for reassignment. The common reference in 
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the distribution process is the projected rotation date, which is fixed for each 
position. Placement officers post billets that are to become vacant in the next 
year, and assignment officers recognize that some officers are completing their 
tours of duty and will need to be reassigned, as shown in Figure 6. The 
distribution is conducted separately for each career community. 
 
Figure 6.  Example of billets available for SWO specialty at rank of O-5 
(from Black 2014, 24) 
(3) Information Technology Support 
The officer distribution process uses a web-based system hosted at the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel under the Navy Personnel Command which allows 
easy access to assignment officers and personnel information. The enlisted 
distribution process, on the other hand, has a more elaborate tool for placing and 
assigning jobs. 
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The system, called Career Management System/Interactive Detailing 
(CMS/ID), allows the enlisted personnel to select jobs that meet professional and 
personal interests and submit their own application, as if they were in a civilian 
labor market. Not all jobs are offered, but just those available for their rate and 
specialty. The jobs are also filtered according to the preferences previously 
communicated and suggested by the assignment officer, according to each 
profile. Potential applicants can view job details and apply for up to five jobs. 
After that, he can use the system to follow the status of the submitted application. 
The selection does not occur automatically. The assignment officer should 
access each job and choose the most qualified candidate manually, which keeps 
this process subjective and labor intensive, as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Example of application comparison (after BUPERS Business 
Transformation Office 2012, 19) 
C. COMPARISON BETWEEN BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE AND U.S. NAVY 
PROCESSES 
The Brazilian Air Force uses an algorithm that automates the overall 
matching of preferences between commands and officers, but not the 
requirements of human capital. The available qualitative information helps the 
ODGSA representatives make their choices, but they are not compelled to follow 
the officer’s experience or preferences for areas of specialization. 
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The U.S. Navy has not automated the assignment process. Instead, it 
uses information technology to facilitate the interaction of officers and their 
representatives. The commands do not choose officers; they choose 
requirements. The assignment officer matches requirements and officers’ 
preferences considering the career development. 
The development of a mathematical model for the Brazilian Air Force to 
consider all the information manually handled by the U.S. Navy would be very 
complex. Since the requirements exist to ensure a satisfactory performance in 
the next job, the model should include only the relevant variables that drive 
performance. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explains the assignment process of officers in the Brazilian 
Air Force and describes the same process in the U.S. Navy for comparison. 
Since the divergence in the assignment processes between the two services is 
not correlated with differences in the operational environment, both processes 
can be compared without restriction. In the Brazilian Air Force, the assignment 
process matches free preferences between officers and commands. In the U.S. 
Navy, commands do not choose officers; they choose requirements to be 
matched with officers’ preferences and career needs. It makes the process less 
subjective in the U.S. Navy and inspires the development of a model for the 
Brazilian Air Force. 
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III. PERFORMANCE DRIVERS 
A. THEORY OF WORK PERFORMANCE 
Between 1930 and 1980, many researchers attempted to find the 
antecedents of performance. The typical approach consisted of searching for a 
simple relationship between job performance and one or two variables. Despite 
the enormous effort, counted in thousands of studies, the researchers “failed to 
provide strong and consistent predictors of performance” (Blumberg and Pringle 
1982, 560). 
Inspired by an action-research project designed to increase job 
satisfaction and performance simultaneously in an American underground coal 
mine, Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 560–69) propose a model to explain work 
performance. They identify a broad range of variables from the literature and 
from 13 months of field observation inside the coal mine and classify them in 
three dimensions, as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Dimensions of work performance (after Blumberg and 
Pringle 1982, 562) 
Dimensions Variables 
Capacity to perform Ability, age, health, knowledge, skills, intelligence, 
level of education, endurance, stamina, energy level, 
motor skills. 
 
Willingness to perform Motivation, job satisfaction, job status, anxiety, 
legitimacy of participation, attitude, perceived task 
characteristics, job involvement, ego involvement, self-
image, norms, values, perceived role, expectations, 
feeling of equity. 
 
Opportunity to perform Tools, equipment, materials, and suppliers; working 
conditions; actions of coworkers; leader behavior; 
mentorism; organizational policies, rules, and 




The model explains the interaction of the dimensions (Figure 8) and 
describes performance (P) as a function of the product of opportunity (O), 
capacity (C), and willingness (W) in the equation P = O x C x W. 
 
Figure 8.  Interaction of dimensions (after Blumberg and Pringle 1982, 
565) 
The multiplicative model means that performance only occurs if all three 
elements are present in some degree. In case any element assumes a value 
equal to zero, the value for performance will be zero. It is an extreme condition. 
More frequently, an element can have a low value, which will decrease the 
overall performance without reducing it to zero. Besides the multiplicative 
equation, Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 565) also comment on the use of a 
summative model. 
A summative model seems more appropriate for the variables that 
comprise each of the dimensions. For example, in a particular 
situation, capacity to perform might consist of a weighted algebraic 
sum of the effects of ability, age and health. Even if one of the 
variables, such as age, were not favorably represented, there still 
would be some capacity remaining for performing because of 
favorable levels of ability and health. (Blumberg and Pringle 1982, 
565) 
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Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 565) use social learning theory to justify the 
model. According to this theory, human behavior can be explained in terms of 
“continuous reciprocal interaction between cognitive, behavioral, and 
environmental influences” (Bandura 1977, vii). Referencing Bandura’s concept of 
reciprocal interaction, Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 565) explain that external 
circumstances can change behavior, and behavior can change external 
circumstances. 
At the individual level, performance is determined by opportunity, 
willingness, and capacity and, in turn, is a partial determinant of 
each. The act of performing, for instance, gives one experience on 
the job, which over time may improve the individual’s skills or 
abilities (elements of capacity). High job performance may increase 
a worker’s job satisfaction and reduce his or her anxiety about 
performance (elements of willingness). And one individual’s superb 
performance may inspire his or her co-workers (an element of 
opportunity) to perform better, which in turn may impel the 
individual to even higher performance (examples of his can be seen 
most clearly at athletic events). (Blumberg and Pringle 1982, 565) 
Schermerhorn, Gardner, and Martin (1990, 48) consider this model “a 
comprehensive approach to individual performance” and call it the “individual 
performance equation.” Their equation uses different names for the three 
dimensions: ability, instead of capacity; effort, instead of willingness; and support, 
instead of opportunity, even though they refer to Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 
560–69). 
Mathis, Jackson, and Valentine (2014, 149) confirm the statements of 
Schermerhorn, Gardner, and Martin (1990, 48) and state that “the relationship of 
those factors is broadly defined in management literature.” The equation is the 
same as described by Schermerhorn, Gardner, and Martin (1990, 48): 
Performance (P) = Ability (A) x Effort (E) x Support (S) 
1. Ability 
Performance begins with ability, considered to be the collection of skills 
and other personal characteristics needed in a job (Schermerhorn, Gardner, and 
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Martin 1990, 48). First of all, managers must ensure the employees have the 
right attributes by using procedures that match individual talents and job 
requirements (Ibid., 48–49). If the employee does not have the requirements, the 
manager should use training programs to develop the employee’s abilities or 
reassign him to achieve a better person-job fit (Ibid., 49). 
Schermerhorn, Gardner, and Martin (1990, 49) consider the assignment 
as an alternative for training and a solution for improving performance. 
Assignment is a matter of choice and usually does not incur extra expenses as it 
does with training. Moreover, avoiding costs with basic training saves resources 
to be used in advanced training with employees who already have some 
experience in the job, which creates a virtuous cycle in the improvement of 
human capital. 
To illustrate the effect of ability on performance, let’s consider the case of 
a hypothetical senior officer. If he is assigned to be a chief of a logistics division 
without specific knowledge or experience in that area, his performance will be 
impaired no matter how motivated he is in the job and how much support he has 
in his new organization. To avoid underperformance, the organization will have to 
provide basic training for someone who was supposed to have advanced ability 
in the job. The alternative of reassigning him to achieve a better person-job fit is 
not usual practice in the Brazilian Air Force, because knowledge and experience 
are not considered factors in the assignment process. 
2. Effort 
Performance involves effort, which is the willingness to work hard. Unlike 
other factors, the decision to put effort into a job is not under managerial control, 
which explains the reason why theories of motivation are so emphasized in 
human resources management (Schermerhorn, Gardner, and Martin 1990, 50). 
Victor Vroom made an important contribution to the management literature by 
introducing the Expectancy Theory, which has three factors: 
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• Expectancy: A person’s belief that working hard will result in 
a desired level of task performance being achieved (this is 
sometimes called effort-performance expectancy).  
• Instrumentality: A person’s belief that successful 
performance will be followed by rewards and other potential 
outcomes (this is sometimes called performance-outcome 
expectancy).  
• Valence: The value a person assigns to possible rewards 
and other work-related outcomes. (Schermerhorn 1993, 451) 
The effect of effort on performance can also be exemplified in the case of 
the senior officer. If he is assigned to be the chief of a logistics division but he is 
not motivated in this job, his performance will suffer regardless of his level of 
ability and the support provided by the organization. The reason for the lack of 
motivation may reside in one of those three factors: 
• Expectancy: He may not believe that he will have good 
performance in that job because he has never worked with logistics 
before, even though the organization provides basic training for 
newcomers.  
• Instrumentality: He may think that if he demonstrates high 
performance, he will not be rewarded with the possibility of having 
priority in choosing his next assignment. Instead, he may become 
indispensable in a job he does not like. 
• Valence: He may not care for any kind of reward offered by his 
next job, because none of them can offset the disadvantage of 
living in a location that his family does not want to be in. 
The Expectancy Theory assumes that all these factors must exist in order 
to motivate the employee. Schermerhorn (1993, 451) asserts that this theory 
“can help managers to better understand and respond to different points of view 
in the workplace” and proposes a list of actions (Table 3) to maximize 




Table 3.   Managerial implication of expectancy theory (after 
Schermerhorn 1993, 452) 
To Maximize Expectancy 
 
Make the person feel competent and 
capable of achieving the desired 
performance level 
• Select workers with ability 
• Train workers to use ability 
• Support work efforts 
• Clarify performance goals 
 
To Maximize Instrumentality 
 
Make the person confident in 
understanding which rewards and 
outcomes will follow performance 
accomplishments 
 
• Clarify psychological contracts 
• Communicate performance-
outcome possibilities 
• Demonstrate what rewards are 
contingent on performance 
To Maximize Valence 
 
Make the person understand the value 




• Identify individual needs 
• Adjust rewards to match these 
needs 
 
The first action suggested by Schermerhorn (1993, 452) to increase 
motivation is to “select workers with ability,” which is supported by the interaction 
model developed by Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 560–69). The mismatch 
between job requirements and employee’s ability is only one source of low 
motivation. The underlying causes are complex and may be driven by either 
professional or personal issues. The simplest way to address this problem in the 
assignment process is to consult the officer about his preferences and take them 
into consideration. 
3. Support 
Performance requires support in both physical and social aspects of the 
work environment. “Even the most hard-working and highly capable individuals 
will be unable to maximize their performance if they do not have the necessary 
support” (Schermerhorn, Gardner, and Martin 1990, 49). Blumberg and Pringle 





field of forces surrounding a person and his or her task that enables or constrains 
that person’s task performance and that are beyond the person’s direct control.” 
The case of the senior officer can also be used to illustrate the effect of 
support on performance. He may be motivated with his new assignment and 
have all the requirements desired for the job. But if the organization does not 
have an adequate budget for clerical issues and does not provide any kind of 
information technology device to help manage the logistics division, his 
performance will be lower than expected. Considering other examples of low 
support, he may face a lack of autonomy, high workload, and no empathy from 
his boss and co-workers. 
B. THE EFFECT OF JOB EXPERIENCE ON JOB PERFORMANCE 
Although experience has been frequently used as a predictor of 
performance in the selection of employees, little research has been devoted to 
the effect of job experience on performance (McDaniel, Schmidt, and Hunter 
1988, 327). Regardless of the existence of formal training, “new employees must 
learn the methods and skills required for job performance over a period of time 
on the job” (Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge 1986, 432). Therefore, the amount 
of experience is expected to have a positive effect on performance. 
Philosophers like John Locke and Aristotle believed that the human being 
is born with a blank mind and, throughout life, new experiences imprint 
knowledge on it. These philosophers did not distinguish between experience and 
knowledge, but there are theoretical and practical reasons to do so (Quiñones, 
Ford, and Teachout 1995, 889). For example, attending a course in logistics 
management may increase the descriptive knowledge of a senior officer, but only 
hands-on experience will give him the procedural knowledge to master the 
subject. 
Besides affecting different dimensions of knowledge, similar experience 
may not produce the same amount of knowledge (Quiñones, Ford, and Teachout 
1995, 890). For example, an officer who worked with logistics in the past and 
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another officer with no previous involvement in this area are likely to extract 
different amounts of experience from observing a warehouse operation. 
Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge (1986, 432–39), using empirical data, 
study the effect of experience in similar jobs, not on organizational seniority. 
They develop a causal model (Figure 9) that explains the impact of job 
experience and general mental ability on job knowledge, job performance (work 
sample performance), and supervisory rating of job performance. This thesis only 
analyzes the effect of experience on performance. 
 
Figure 9.  Causal model relating job experience and job performance 
(after Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge 1986, 434) 
Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge (1986, 436) conclude that the primary 
effect of job experience is on job knowledge, which indirectly increases job 
performance. However, the findings suggest that “job experience leads to the 
acquisition of skills, techniques, methods, psychomotor habits, and so forth, that 
directly produce improvements in performance capabilities independent of 
increases in job knowledge” (Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge 1986, 436).  
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Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge (1986, 438) propose that the difference 
in job performance caused by experience decreases as the average level of 
experience increases. To clarify, they present an example of the effect of hiring 
new employees at the beginning of each year. If this routine does not change, at 
the end of the fourth year, the most experienced cohort (senior) will have four 
years of experience, while the least experienced (junior), only one. The level of 
experience in the junior cohort will be only 25% of the senior group. Tracking 
these two cohorts over time, when the senior group completes 20 years of 
continuous employment, the junior will have 16 years. At that moment, the level 
of experience in the junior cohort will be 80% of the senior group. 
These findings are confirmed by McDaniel, Schmidt, and Hunter (1988, 
329): “Results indicate that for all levels of job experience and for both low- and 
high-complexity jobs, the correlation between job experience and job 
performance is positive.” Furthermore, “the correlation is highest for samples with 
low mean levels of job experience” (Ibid.).  
One limitation of the research conducted by Schmidt, Hunter, and 
Outerbridge (1986, 432–39) is that the conclusions are based only on non-
managerial employees. McEnrue (1988, 175–84) overcomes this issue by 
studying the relationship between job experience of managers and their 
performance. 
This study yielded evidence of a strong, positive relationship 
between the length of job experience among early-career 
managers and their performance. Those with longer tenure in the 
role of restaurant manager achieved higher sales and realized 
larger profits. … However, the amount of time an individual had 
managed a particular restaurant or worked with the organization 
were not significant predictors compared to length of time as a 
manager. (McEnrue 1988, 181) 
Dokko, Wilk, and Rothbard (2009, 51–68), supported by psychological 
theory, propose that sociocognitive factors interfere in the portability of 
experience among jobs. They confirm that “prior occupational experience has a 
positive effect on performance via knowledge and skill,” but they find “a negative 
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direct effect that diminishes the overall relationship” (Ibid., 65). According to their 
research, related work experience can have “a negative effect on performance 
through institutional mechanisms (i.e., norms) or cognitive mechanisms (i.e., 
schemas and scripts) that lead to rigidities in behavior or thinking” (Ibid., 54). 
However, they also find that “those who feel they fit well into the culture of the 
new firm are less subject to the negative effects of rigidities on performance” 
(Ibid., 63). This suggests that willingness to work under a culture affects the 
capacity to use previous experience in benefit of the performance, which is also 
explained by the interaction model proposed by Blumberg and Pringle (1982, 
560–69). 
C. PERFORMANCE DRIVERS FOR THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE 
Previous studies suggest that performance is driven by ability, effort, and 
support. Experience in the job, not in the organization, also affects performance, 
either directly or indirectly through knowledge, and is aggregated in the ability 
dimension. To select the relevant performance drivers for the officer assignment 
process, some peculiarities related to the officer community in the Brazilian Air 
Force must be taken into consideration. 
The Brazilian Air Force uses the concept of an internal labor market to fill 
vacant jobs. The officer’s career follows a bottom-up path, and there is no lateral 
transfer among communities. Future aviators join the Air Force with a high school 
diploma and attend the same undergraduate course at the Air Force Academy. 
Promotion is based on tenure, and all aviators are supposed to reach the rank of 
O-6. There are two mandatory career development courses: one at the rank of 
O-3 and the other at the rank of O-5. It makes the aviator community very 
homogeneous regarding education. Although some officers may have the 
opportunity to attend a postgraduate course, either budgeted by the Air Force or 
by personal resources, the level of education can be considered constant in each 
rank. 
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Besides the level of education, ability may also be affected by individual 
attributes (e.g., general mental ability and personality traits). However, they are 
not relevant for the assignment process, because all officers must be assigned, 
which keeps constant the sum of these attributes across jobs. It is expected that 
any ODGSA wants to receive the “best” officer. But who receives the “best” will 
leave the “worst” to the other. The use of individual attributes in the assignment 
process is a win-lose game. 
The assignment of senior officers is executed separately for each 
community and for each rank. Under theses constraints, education is constant, 
so it does not differentiate officers. Individual attributes are not constant, but they 
do not differentiate ODGSA preferences. The only performance driver that is 
relevant in the ability dimension is experience, because each officer acquires 
different experience along the career, which makes them attractive for specific 
jobs. 
If information about vacant jobs is available, as it happens in the U.S. 
Navy, the officer can make his own choices by ranking the preferences according 
to the complex system of variables that drives his motivation. He is the most 
qualified person to assess his professional and personal interests. As a result, 
the effort dimension, translated in the officer’s preferences, should be used in the 
assignment process to improve performance, as exhaustively debated in the 
literature. 
Although the last dimension of performance—support—should be a 
concern for all organizations because it affects performance, this dimension is 
irrelevant for the assignment process, because the level of physical support is 
the same for any officer that occupies the same position. The social support may 
be different, but it is absorbed by the officer’s preferences that consider the 
overall “quality of the job” as a criterion of selection and ranking. 
Therefore, the performance drivers that are relevant for the assignment 
process are experience, in the ability dimension (A), and officer’s preferences, in 
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the effort dimension (E). For the Brazilian Air Force, the individual performance 
equation should be described as follows: 
Performance (P) = Experience (A) x Preference (E) 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explains the main theories of work performance and 
peculiarities of the officer community in the Brazilian Air Force in order to enable 
the selection of relevant variables for the development of the model. The starting 
point is the study conducted by Blumberg and Pringle (1982), who propose a 
model to predict work performance based on the interaction of three dimensions. 
Their model became known in the literature as the individual performance 
equation and explains performance as a function of ability, effort, and support. 
Other studies find that job experience also affects performance via job 
knowledge, which belongs to the ability dimension. After comparing these studies 
with the characteristics of the Brazilian Air Force, the three dimensions are 
narrowed down to only two variables: experience and preference. 
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IV. DECISION MODELING 
The assignment process is a decision-making activity in which the service 
faces a trade-off between frequent conflicting interests. Commands want to fill 
their positions with the best officers according to their criteria, and officers want 
to be assigned to jobs that satisfy their interests. Nobody is willing to be worse off 
at the end. The purpose of an assignment model is not only to automate the 
assignment of a large inventory of people, but also to remove the subjectivity of 
this process and make it transparent and fair, regardless of the quantity of people 
being assigned. 
Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair (2013, 2) define decision modeling as a 
“scientific approach to managerial decision making” and argue that “the resulting 
model should typically be such that the decision-making process is not affected 
by personal bias, whim, emotions and guesswork.” Managerial decisions should 
be guided by scientific methods instead of personal preferences. 
Decision modeling techniques have been used successfully by many 
organizations to solve complex problems in a wide variety of areas, like business, 
government, health care, and education. Although they are very efficient, it is 
“important to be familiar with the limitations, assumptions, and specific 
applicability of the model” (Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair 2013, 2). 
In many organizations, managers allocate scarce resources by identifying 
the best, or optimal, solution among thousands of alternatives. To facilitate this 
process, they use mathematical programming. Despite the term, this does not 
require any advanced mathematical or computer software programming skills. 
Among the mathematical programming methods, “the most widely used modeling 
technique designed to help managers in planning and decision-making is linear 
programming (LP),” which can be efficiently handled by using spreadsheet 
packages such as Microsoft Excel (Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair 2013, 20). 
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A. ASSIGNMENT MODEL 
Assignment models belong to one class of LP called network flow models. 
“Networks consist of nodes (or points) and arcs (or lines) that connect the nodes 
together.” An assignment model uses the network architecture to find the optimal 
one-to-one assignment of supply to demand, which can be people to project, jobs 
to machine, and so on (Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair 2013, 162). 
The concept of the assignment model is illustrated in a simple example 
that has three officers and three jobs (Figure 10). The decision variables are 
represented by nine arcs. Each arc is associated with a particular benefit and can 
be chosen or not. The objective function is to maximize the total benefit 
considering all assignments. Some constraints are mandatory to guarantee a 
one-to-one assignment: each officer must be assigned to only one job, and each 
job must have only one officer assigned.  
 
Figure 10.  Network model for personnel assignment 
All LP share the characteristic of allowing the decision variables to have 
fractional values and therefore one additional constraint limiting the decisions 
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variable to binary values should be included. For this reason, sometimes studies 
dealing with assignment problems are classified as integer programming (IP).  
The simplicity of the concept behind the assignment model may raise 
questions among managers about the utility of this technique. Someone may 
argue that it is easier and faster to solve the problem by hand than to set it up in 
a spreadsheet. The previous example has only six possible solutions for 
assigning officers to jobs. But a model that has 10 officers and 10 jobs, which is 
still a small problem, will result in 10! (= 10 x 9 x 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1), or 
3,628,800 possible combinations. It would be unfeasible for anyone to find the 
best solution manually among all these alternatives. 
B. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
In addition to the fact that few studies have been conducted to develop LP 
models for the assignment process, the models are tailored to specific problems, 
which decreases the degree of portability of algorithms among studies. Unless 
the models are developed under the same background, it is difficult to make 
comparisons. Therefore, the following literature review is conducted to present 
some obstacles faced by LP users, instead of judging the validity of the model for 
the assignment process. 
1. Two-Sided Matching for the U.S. Navy’s Enlisted Detailing 
Process: A Comparison of Deferred Acceptance and Linear 
Programming via Simulation 
In their master’s thesis, Ho and Low (2002) compare the performance of 
LP via simulation against a particular two-sided matching algorithm called 
Deferred Acceptance (DA). Both LP and DA are “the principal methods used in 
the market for two-sided matching processes” (Ibid., 81). Ho and Low (2002, 17) 
explain the logic of the DA algorithm through an example with consultants and 
interns that has been converted in this thesis to officers and ODGSA. 
Assume that each officer and ODGSA have ranked each other according 
to their preferences. Each officer starts the process by showing his interest to the 
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most preferred ODGSA. Each ODGSA temporarily keeps the best officer, who 
may appear in any position of the preference list, and rejects the others. The 
rejected officer proposes again to the second highest ranked ODGSA in his list. If 
the ODGSA considers the new proposal preferable to the first one, the ODGSA 
keeps the new and discards the first. The process continues until none of the 
proposals are rejected in a step. 
Ho and Low (2002, v) argue that previous studies have found great 
benefits in favor of DA, “which ensures stable matches, prevents ‘off-the-site’ 
trades between matching parties and upholds integrity of the matching system.” 
On the other hand, LP can optimize the entire assignment system and promote a 
balanced approach among preferences of both parties (Ho and Low, 2002, v). 
After performing 100 simulation runs, Ho and Low (2002) compare the 
outcomes from the DA and the LP algorithms using “quantitative measures 
(percent matches), qualitative measures (average utility score and stable 
matches) and composite measures” (Ho and Low 2002, 81). The results suggest 
that the LP method has better performance than the DA algorithm in percent 
matches and when the measures are “combined into equally weighted composite 
scores.” There is no difference in average utility between them. The only 
advantage of DA over LP is reaching stable matches (Ho and Low 2002, 81–82). 
2. Assignment of Employee to Workplaces under Consideration 
of Employee Competences and Preferences 
In their research paper, Peters and Zelewski (2007, 84–99) develop a 
model for the assignment of employees to workplaces under consideration of 
employee competences and preferences. Peters and Zelewski (2007, 85) define 
competence as “the ability of an employee to utilize his or her knowledge to 
achieve a predefined goal, such as an effective and efficient execution of a task.” 
This is a broad definition that encompasses all variables under the ability 
dimension, as explained in the previous chapter. Although their research and this 
thesis are different in scope, both have the same theoretical background. 
 36 
Non-fulfillment of competence requirements as well as assignment 
contrary to employee preference may easily lead to employee 
demotivation. Firstly, workplace assignment based upon individual 
competences enables the employee to select the appropriate 
activities to perform the tasks. As a result, they are able to 
complete their tasks more easily. Secondly, the consideration of 
competence preferences leads to higher motivation since 
employees are normally more motivated to complete tasks related 
to their interests and abilities. (Peters and Zelewski 2007, 85) 
The model chosen by Peters and Zelewski (2007, 84–99) uses goal 
programming (GP), which allows the existence of multiple objective functions 
(Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair 2013, 230). In GP models, the first step is 
setting a desired target for each objective, which is viewed as a goal. After that, 
the goals are weighted or ranked according to the level of importance: “With GP 
we try to minimize deviations between the specified goals and what we can 
actually achieve for the multiple objective functions within the given constraints” 
(Ibid., 231). 
Peters and Zelewski (2007, 84–99) propose two models using the same 
set of three different objectives. In one model, the objectives are ranked, and the 
problem solved according to the sequence of priorities; in the other, they are 
given the same priority and considered simultaneously in an aggregated 
objective function. The objective function is set up to minimize the sum of 
weighted discrepancies. 
These discrepancies are firstly caused by the weighted deviations 
between competence levels required for a workplace and the actual 
competence levels of the employees, secondly caused by the 
deviations between the importance of competences to a workplace 
and the employees’ preferences regarding the competences, as 
well as thirdly caused by weighted deviations between the actual 
workplace attributes and the employees’ preferred values of the 
workplace attributes. (Peters and Zelewski 2007, 96–97) 
Peters and Zelewski (2007, 97) explain that both models have some 
deficiency for practical application: they rely on a significant amount of input data; 
these data may not be updated regularly and some may be fuzzy. Balakrishnan, 
 37 
Render, and Stair (2013, 234) point out two drawbacks for the weighted goals 
approach: first, all goals must be measured in the same unit; second, “it is not 
always easy to assign suitable weights for the different deviation variables.” 
3. Optimizing Marine Security Guard Assignments 
In his master’s thesis, Enoka (2011) proposes a network flow model to 
assign Marine security guards to embassy detachments. The model deals with 
multiple demands between different sources and aims to balance the guards’ 
experiences across all facilities. Experience is classified in four levels according 
to the number of tours of duty the Marine accomplished as a security guard. 
The model handles many attributes, among those, the individual’s 
preference. The Marines express their preferences for duty stations by ranking 
three detachments and two regions of choice, but their preferences are only 
taken into consideration after other priorities have been satisfied (Enoka 2011, 
10).  
To optimize the assignments based on different attributes, the model 
relies on a multitude of weights, which adds subjectivity to the algorithm. These 
weights can be changed at the user’s discretion. Enoka (2011, 39) states that the 
model enables the Marine Corps to “adjust attribute weights based on guidance 
from the Commanding Officer.” The algorithm “allows the user to exercise a 
degree of control over the assignment process by setting weights to emphasize 
or deemphasize particular attributes.” The model even “allows the user to force 
or forbid assignments” (Ibid., 15). 
Besides the arbitrary weight for each attribute, the model assigns equally 
arbitrary penalties between 0 and 1 for each Marine-billet pair. “If the pair results 
in a penalty, the penalty is multiplied by the weight of the violated attribute” 
(Enoka 2011, 39).  
After running the model with four different sets of weights and comparing 
the results with actual assignments, Enoka (2011, 58) concludes that the model 
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provides “solutions that result in a higher overall satisfaction level than manually 
generated assignments.” Moreover, “these results demonstrate that it is possible 
to satisfy many [Marines’] preferences without sacrificing solution quality with 
regard to other [attributes]” (Enoka 2011, 57–58). However, Enoka (2011) does 
not comment that each set of weights used in his analysis produces a different 
outcome, nor does he provide any recommendation about how to tackle the 
subjectivity behind this comprehensive model.  
4. Equitably Distributing Quality of Marine Security Guards Using 
Integer Programming 
In his master’s thesis, Sabado (2013) develops a model to equitably 
distribute the quality of Marine security guards among diplomatic facilities. “The 
definition of Quality (Q) is flexible in that it is based on a decision-maker’s 
preference and can be a function of multiple categories or a single one.” In the 
proposed model, quality is a function of recommendation, rank, experience, and 
performance rating. “The model uses a value-based hierarchy measurement 
scale that places weights on specific attributes for individuals to quantify the 
quality of each Marine” (Sabado 2013, 13). 
The objective function is set up to distribute quality uniformly among all 
nine regions by minimizing the sum of squared differences. Since this function is 
not linear, the algorithm is a nonlinear programming (NLP) model. Balakrishnan, 
Render, and Stair (2013, 242) assert that, in practice, NLP models are difficult to 
solve and become even more difficult as the number of decision variables 
increases. The optimal solution to an NPL model does not need to be at the 
corner point of the feasible region. Depending on where the search process 
starts, it can terminate at either a global or a local optimal solution (Balakrishnan, 
Render, and Stair 2013, 242). 
Sabado (2013, 25) tests four variations of the same model and concludes 
that “the four models are limited due to the subjectivity involved in quantifying the 
value of each category and weighted attribute.” The best way to quantify the 
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individual quality is to use cardinal numbers in a value hierarchy scale, as both 
coefficients and weighted attributes. However, each model uses the preferences 
of decision-makers as ordinal instead of cardinal numbers (Sabado 2013, 25).  
Ordinal numbers were used because of the difficulty in using an 
accurate value to place on categories such as Recommendation. 
For example, in reality, if a decision-maker gives an individual a 
Recommendation value of 4 and a Rank value of 2, a statement 
can only be made that the decision-maker places a higher value on 
the recommendation … than on the rank of the individual. We 
cannot make the conclusion that the recommendation … should be 
given twice as much value as rank. However, regardless of the type 
of mathematical programming software used, all values are treated 
as cardinal numbers. Therefore, in the previous example, 
recommendation is treated as having twice as much value as rank. 
(Sabado 2013, 25) 
In his recommendations, Sabado (2013, 45) states that this model does 
not take into consideration several other possible criteria for assignment, such as 
individual preference, and finishes by saying that his “model provides results 
based on a set of established criteria.” 
C. LESSONS FOR THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE  
Linear programming is a technique that solves the assignment problem 
with an optimal solution. However, the efficacy of the model depends on its 
setup, as inferred from the review of previous studies. 
Ho and Low (2002) compare LP with DA and conclude that the only 
advantage of DA is reaching stable matches. Even though DA has been used in 
assignments, this technique does not apply to the Brazilian Air Force, because it 
just matches free preferences between supply and demand for labor. The use of 
DA would hide not only the diversity of criteria among ODGSA, but also the 
waste of human capital in the assignment process. 
Peters and Zelewski (2007) argue that the practical utility of models that 
require a significant amount of weighted input data is doubtful. These data may 
not be updated regularly and some may be fuzzy. It is not always easy to assign 
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weights for different variables. The goals should also be measured in the same 
unit. 
Enoka (2011) suggests that LP techniques can leverage the assignment 
process to a higher level of overall satisfaction, and states that it is possible to 
satisfy individual preferences without sacrificing other attributes. However, no 
comment is made about the subjectivity of assigning weights and penalties. 
The review from Sabado (2013) shows that the use of many weighted 
variables should be avoided since it increases the subjectivity of the solution. If 
possible, the model should not be an NLP, because it may reach solutions not 
optimal for the entire assignment. 
Therefore, the development of a mathematical model for the Brazilian Air 
Force should consider equations with simple formulations that do not require the 
assignment of arbitrary weights to its variables so that LP techniques can be 
successfully applied to find the optimal solution. 
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V. PROPOSED MODEL 
A. NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
The proposed model does not encompass all factors addressed in the 
assignment process. Any attempt to do so might lead to the subjectivity of using 
many weighted variables. Instead, the model is considered a component of the 
assignment process architecture, which must be redesigned to absorb the 
features not included in the individual performance equation. The new 
assignment process has four sub-processes: officer distribution, job placement, 
job selection, and officer assignment. 
The first sub-process is the officer distribution. Officers who demand a 
permanent change of station for mandatory or voluntary reasons make a request 
through the SIGPES. After approval, these officers are considered in transit, 
which changes the status of their current positions from occupied to vacant. The 
total inventory of officers in transit is distributed by the COMGEP, considering the 
new TLP/TEP ratio of each ODGSA after subtracting those officers. 
The second is the job placement. With the information of how many 
officers, discriminated by rank and specialty, each ODGSA is entitled to receive, 
the ODGSA selects the positions it wants to fill and posts the available jobs in the 
SIGPES. Each job is described as related to a different mix of desired areas of 
experience. For example, the chief of logistics in an air base may be expected to 
have experience in logistics and air operations, while the same position in a 
headquarter may require experience in logistics and finance. These areas of 
specialization must be previously standardized by the Brazilian Air Force. 
The third sub-process is the job selection. Each officer in transit accesses 
the SIGPES and selects 10 jobs in decreasing order of preference. Since the 
assignment process in the Brazilian Air Force is executed separately for each 
community and for each rank, the only relevant variables not addressed by the 
process are experience and preference, as explained in Chapter III. Regarding 
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the experience, the SIGPES already stores information about previous jobs, 
although it does not classify them in areas of specialization. After this new 
capability has been implemented, the system will be able to convert the time 
spent in each job into the amount of experience for each area of specialization. In 
this case, when the officer selects a specific job, the SIGPES adds up the 
number of years of experience in the areas recommended for that job and 
divides it by the amount of experience presented by the officer in transit that best 
fits the job. It generates a relative coefficient of fitness for each officer in each 
job, which is used as the unit of measure for experience. In relation to the 
measure of preference, a weight is attributed to each position in the sequence of 
choices. 
The fourth and last sub-process is the officer assignment, which is the 
result of the application of the mathematical model that uses LP techniques to 
optimize the person-job fit, taking the individual preferences into consideration. 
B. MATHEMATICAL MODEL  
The current algorithm used by the Brazilian Air Force is an assignment 
model by which many officers (employees) are assigned to each ODGSA 
(employers). The objective is to maximize the sum of weighted preferences 
between both groups. Besides not capitalizing on the officer’s experience, the 
model does not ensure that the officer will have the desired job. Person-job fit 
and individual preferences for specific jobs are handled at the discretion of the 
ODGSA and are not controlled by the model. The only certainty is that the officer 
has a good possibility of living in the location he wants, because each employer 
accepts many employees. 
On the other hand, the proposed model deals with the assignment of one 
officer to each available job and aims to maximize job performance, which is 
used as a proxy for the interaction of person-job fit and individual preferences. It 
also gives the officer the opportunity to prioritize the location, if he wishes, since 
he can select all available jobs in the same work station. 
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1. Variables 
The model is based on the individual performance equation and has the 
following variables: 
i =  officer 
j =  assigned job 
k =  current job 
Aij =  relative level of experience Bij in comparison to Cj 
Bij= years of experience of officer i in areas correlated with job j 
Cj =  largest amount of years of experience in areas correlated with job j 
among all officers in transit 
Eij =  weight attributed to rank Rij 
Pij =  performance of officer i in job j 
Rij =  rank of preference of officer i for job j, enumerated from 1 to 10 in 
decreasing order of priority 
Xij =  assignment of officer i to job j 
Z =  objective function to be maximized 
2. Coefficient of Performance 
The coefficient of performance is the result of the individual performance 
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Equation 1 ensures that Aij will have a maximum value of 1. The same 
occurs with Equation 2 in respect to Eij. It means that both ability (experience) 
and effort (preference) have the same importance in estimating officer’s 
performance in Equation 3. This setup is important because it removes any bias 
from the model that uses Pij as the coefficient to be optimized. 
Equation 2 is a linear function and generates values for Eij that are equally 
spaced across the rank of preferences. It is supposed to represent the level of 
satisfaction for each job, which may not hold true for every person. However, it 
makes the algorithm strategy-resistant. Since the model aims to maximize 
performance, if the officers had the discretion to attribute weights according to 
their perception of utility, someone could game the algorithm by assigning a low 
value for all options except for the first. When the algorithm tries to optimize Pij, it 
will be forced to assign the person to his first choice to avoid low values of 
performance generated by any other option. 
Another remark is that Eij is restricted to the minimum value of 0.001, 
which is 100 times smaller than the 10th option. This variable is not allowed to 
reach the value of zero, because jobs situated beyond the 10th option are not 
necessarily rejected by the officer. It just indicates that these jobs are not ranked 
in the top 10. Moreover, attributing the value of zero would reduce Pij to zero, 
which would make the algorithm lose the information about experience and not 
find the optimal solution. 
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The constraints are defined by four equations. Each officer must be 
assigned to only one job (Equation 5). Each job must receive only one officer 
(Equation 6). Assigned and current jobs must be different (Equation 7). 
Assignments must be integer numbers (binary), assuming the value of 1 if officer 
i is assigned to job j; 0 otherwise (Equation 8). 
C. EVALUATION 
The model is evaluated by analyzing the results obtained through 
simulation in three different scenarios. The simulation uses Microsoft Excel 2010 
with OpenSolver, which is an add-in that extends Excel’s built-in Solver with a 
more powerful linear programming tool. 
The objective is to assign 100 officers to 100 jobs. The initial setup 
considers a uniform distribution of officer’s experiences across jobs, with each 
officer occupying a different position at the beginning of each round. Each 
simulation starts with two independent tables of random numbers, one for ability 
and the other for effort, which are transformed according to the specificity of the 
scenario and then multiplied to generate the coefficient Pij used in the objective 
function. 
Although the value for ability is random, the average of the initial level of 
person-job fit (Aij) is slightly greater than 50%, because Aij is a proportion of a 
random number in relation to the highest one that is observed in each job. 
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Consequently, each job will always have a value for Aij equal to 1, which makes 
its average greater than 50%. 
Two indicators are used to compare the change in satisfaction of 
commands and officers across scenarios. The overall level of person-job fit, 
measured by the total amount of recommended experience correlated with the 
assigned jobs, is adopted as a reference for estimating the command’s 
satisfaction. Although the degree of person-job fit may also affect officer’s 
motivation, the assignment of jobs according to officer’s preference is a better 
indicator of their satisfaction, since it includes both professional and personal 
interests. Therefore, the distribution of officers along the rank of preferences is 
adopted as the second indicator. Their satisfaction is measured by the weighted 
average of Eij in relation to the quantity of officers assigned to each rank. 
The evaluation of the model is based on data collected from 50 runs 
performed in each scenario. After validation in the 95% confidence interval, the 
results are analyzed using descriptive statistics. 
1. Scenario 1 
In the first scenario, each officer selects and ranks 10 jobs randomly, 
regardless of his relative level of experience. It simulates the case in which the 
officer is not driven by professional interests. For example, he may choose only 
jobs available in one specific location to enhance his quality of life. 
The results indicate that, even though the officer may not be concerned 
with his career, the level of person-job fit increases to 77% in relation to the initial 
setup, as shown in Figure 11. Contrary to intuition, the officer is not penalized by 
the increase in person-job fit, since his level of satisfaction is 80.4%, even 
greater than the commands’ satisfaction (77%). As shown in Figure 12, he has 
an aggregated probability of 52.8% of being assigned to one of the first two 
options and 1.9% of not being assigned to any of the selected jobs. 
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 Figure 11.  Level of satisfaction in Scenario 1 
 
Figure 12.  Assignments in Scenario 1 
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2. Scenario 2 
In the second scenario, the officer searches for equilibrium between 
personal and professional interests. He discards all jobs in which he has a 
relative level of experience not greater than 50% and then selects and ranks 10 
jobs randomly from the remaining options. 
The results indicate that the level of person-job fit after assignment 
increases to 84.2% in relation to the initial setup, as shown in Figure 13. Again, 
the officer is not penalized by the increase in person-job fit. Instead, his level of 
satisfaction is 88%, still greater than commands’ satisfaction (84.2%). In this 
scenario, he has an aggregated probability of 68% of being assigned to one of 
the first two options and only 0.2% of not being assigned to any of the selected 
jobs, as shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 13.  Level of satisfaction in Scenario 2 
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 Figure 14.  Assignments in Scenario 2 
3. Scenario 3 
In the third scenario, the officer is driven by professional interests. He 
selects the 10 jobs in which he has the highest relative level of experience and 
ranks them randomly according to personal preferences. 
The results indicate that the level of person-job fit after assignment 
increases to 96% in relation to the initial setup, as shown in Figure 15. In this 
scenario, the overall commands’ satisfaction reaches the highest level (96%), 
greater than the officer’s satisfaction, which is 91.9%. The officer has an 
aggregated probability of 79.2% of being assigned to one of the first two options, 
as shown in Figure 16, and the chance of being assigned to a job not chosen is 
reduced to 0%. 
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 Figure 15.  Level of satisfaction in Scenario 3 
 
Figure 16.  Assignments in Scenario 3 
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D. ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the model shows that the level of satisfaction among 
commands and officers changes in the same direction (Figure 17), suggesting 
the feasibility of an assignment process without trade-offs between the parties. In 
all three scenarios, the overall level of person-job fit increases in relation to the 
initial setup, which enhances the commands’ satisfaction. At the same time, the 
officers have their preferences taken into consideration, which boosts their 
motivation. 
 
Figure 17.  Analysis of satisfaction across scenarios 
The model has some resemblance to the labor market dynamic. If the 
officer selects jobs in which he has relatively low levels of experience, he 
increases the probability of losing the competition to other officers that may better 
fit the jobs. This behavior reduces the chance of being assigned to the most 
preferred jobs, as observed in the first scenario. If he wants to enhance his 
quality of life, he should select jobs for which he has a significant level of relative 
experience among those available in the locations where he can satisfy his 
personal interests, as implied in the second scenario. However, if the officer is 
more concerned with his career, he should choose jobs in which he has the 
greatest level of person-job fit among all officers in transit, as presented in the 
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third scenario, so that he can win the competition for the most preferable jobs 
and take advantage of the previous experience to enhance his job performance. 
In all three scenarios, the officer is the unique player, which makes him 
responsible for his own satisfaction. The only trade-off is between personal and 
professional interests. 
The similarity with the labor market makes the model strategy-resistant. If 
the officer tries to game the algorithm by hiding his previous experience and 
selecting jobs in which he has relatively low levels of person-job fit, the 
probability of getting the desired job decreases. The smartest strategy is 
narrowing down the options with respect to the amount of experience in each 
area of specialization, which increases not only the probability of getting a more 
preferable job, but also the quality of officers received by the commands. 
As a consequence, the model is self-reinforcing. Each time the officer is 
assigned to a job, he enlarges his experience in some specific areas, which 
makes him more competitive to be chosen for jobs related to those areas. After 
some assignments, the officer will acquire a natural specialization without the 
intervention of a career manager. 
 54 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The Brazilian Air Force faces a dilemma with aviators at senior ranks. The 
need to specialize them slows down under the organizational culture, which 
places the aviators in the position of being the sole community able to lead the 
Air Force. As a consequence, aviators outnumber any other specialty within the 
Air Force and occupy a great variety of jobs in different areas, even though they 
acquire the same body of knowledge from the Air Force Academy. 
Instead of suggesting the creation of formal subspecialties or a reduction 
of the aviator rate in the officer community, this thesis used the assignment 
process to go around the organizational culture and proposed a model that could 
increase the performance of those officers with minor changes to the current 
modus operandi. However, the assignment process has its own dilemma: how 
should individual preferences and organizational needs be balanced in the 
assignment process in order to maximize officers’ performance in the Brazilian 
Air Force? Solving it became the primary research question. 
The research started with a comprehensive literature review. First, the 
officer assignment processes in the Brazilian Air Force and U.S. Navy were 
studied for comparison. The findings indicated that the U.S. Navy has a less 
subjective process in which job requirements—and not commands’ preferences, 
as used in the Brazilian Air Force—are matched to officer’s preferences. 
However, the number of variables is too large for a single model. 
To decrease the number of variables, the second review searched for the 
performance drivers that are relevant to the assignment process. Based on work 
performance theories and Brazilian Air Force peculiarities, the variables were 
reduced to only two: job experience, as a driver for ability, and officer’s 
preferences, as a proxy for effort invested in the job. 
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The last literature review studied the decision modeling techniques applied 
to the assignment process. Linear programming seems to be the best choice for 
the proposed model, because it provides an optimal answer for the problem. 
However, to decrease the subjectivity of the solution, the equations should be 
simple enough to not require the assignment of arbitrary weights to its variables. 
The simplicity of the model formulation required the redesign of the 
assignment process, using information technology as applied by the U.S. Navy, 
so that the process could absorb other features not included in the individual 
performance equation. The analysis of the results, obtained through simulation, 
suggested that it is possible to have an assignment process without trade-offs 
between commands and officers. The model makes the satisfaction of 
commands and officers change in the same direction. Furthermore, the model is 
self-reinforcing. Each time the officer is assigned to a job, his experience in some 
areas of specialization increases, which increases the possibility of getting a 
similar job in the next assignment. Finally, after some assignments, the officer 
will acquire a natural specialization and will be considered a key player, instead 
of just a number in the assignment process. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis had the purpose of creating an algorithm to be used in the 
assignment process of senior officers without specialization, as it occurs among 
aviators in the Brazilian Air Force, so that job performance can be maximized.  
(1) Primary Question 
How should individual preferences and organizational needs be balanced 
during the assignment process in order to maximize senior officers’ performance 
in the Brazilian Air Force? 
The main point is to reduce the subjectivity of the assignment process by 
replacing the ODGSA’s preferences with recommended experience. Since the 
assignment process is executed for each rank and specialty, and the aviators 
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share the same background, job experience is the best proxy for person-job fit. 
On the other hand, officers should continue to state their preferences in this 
process, because the preferences are indicators of motivation, which translates 
to commitment to the job. Since both experience and preference are equally 
important factors that affect performance, these variables should receive the 
same treatment in the assignment process, without the use of arbitrary weights. 
The remaining constraints would be absorbed by the assignment process 
architecture, as proposed in this thesis. The analysis of simulations using the 
proposed algorithm suggests that it is possible to increase the satisfaction of 
commands and officers at the same time. 
(2) Secondary Questions 
Which performance drivers are relevant for the assignment process? 
The performance drivers are classified in three dimensions: ability, effort, 
and support. The latter can be discarded in the assignment process, because 
physical support is constant for any officer assigned to the same position, and 
social support is already considered by the officers’ preferences. The individual 
preference summarizes a complex system of factors that drive motivation and is 
an easy way to predict the effort invested in the job. The ability dimension has 
some important variables for the assignment process, but the homogeneity of the 
officer community and the modus operandi in the Brazilian Air Force turn job 
experience into the only relevant proxy for ability. For the Brazilian Air Force, the 
performance drivers can be narrowed down to experience and preference. 
Which decision modeling techniques are applicable in the assignment 
process? 
Linear programming, especially network flow models, has been used 
successfully to solve the assignment problem. However, the model setup affects 
the solution. Trying to build a model with multiple variables, researchers have 
faced the subjectivity of assigning arbitrary weights to different attributes, which 
bias the solution toward the user’s beliefs. It seems that there is a trade-off 
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between the comprehensiveness of the model and its fidelity to human resources 
management theories. In the Brazilian Air Force, the introduction of more 
subjectivity by using a model that embraces many variables may worsen the 
solution instead of optimizing it. For this reason, the proposed algorithm stands 
out for its simplicity and leaves the assignment process architecture in charge of 
the secondary variables. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Recommendations for the Brazilian Air Force 
The Brazilian Air Force should consider balancing the satisfaction of 
commands and senior officers by reformulating the assignment process with a 
new architecture and a new algorithm. Since the validation of the proposed 
model was conducted without comparison with real data, its implementation 
requires a pilot test, so that the algorithm can be adjusted beforehand to any 
unforeseen circumstances. 
(2) Recommendations for Further Research 
The characteristics of the Brazilian Air Force may reduce the portability of 
the proposed model to other services around the world. However, the theoretical 
background of this research seems to be universal, which encourages future 
studies of the same topic. The individual performance equation can be expanded 
with other variables, and the analysis of the results compared with those reported 
in this thesis. If available, real data can be used to measure the strength of the 
model in relation to the assignment process in any country. 
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